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FUNDING AND VIABILITY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS1 
INTRODUCTION 
Governments of many less developed countries have established 
rural financial agencies as important instruments for rapid 
agricultural development. In this paper, we examine some "funding 
problems" experienced by these rural development banks. 2 We argue 
that the credit operations and long run viability of rural 
development banks are affected by the sources of loanable funds. 
The basic funding problem confronting these institutions is to 
secure that volume and composition of loanable funds consistent 
with efficient credit operations and sustained growth of the 
financial institutions. 
This aspect of rural financial institution behaviour has been 
neglected by researchers. The rural finance literature, surveyed. 
by Adams (1977), Lele (1974), and Lipton (1976), has devoted a 
great deal of attention to problems of credit disbursement, 
pricing, and loan recovery. A consensus has emerged that 
distributional equity is not achieved by concessionally priced 
credit programs, that allocative inefficiencies result from 
interest rate subsidies, and that the financial viability of 
credit institutions is undermined by low nominal loan rates of 
interest, high lending costs, and by high rates of default, 
particularly among large farm borrowers. These conclusions 
~ have been derived from analyses of the assets of credit 
institutions. 
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It is doubtful, however, that the performance of rural 
credit institutions and their viability can be divorced from 
considerations of their funding. The study of the liabilities 
or the inf lows can improve our understanding of the credit 
operations of rural development banks, as well as identify 
additional factors germane to the sustained growth of rural 
financial markets. Such an analysis is the subject matter of 
this paper which is divided into five sections. The first 
section describes the main sources of funding, while the second 
and third sections examine their short term implications. The 
fourth section discusses the timepaths of inf lows of loanable 
funds, and posits their implications for longer run institutional 
growth. The fifth section examines three ways of optimizing 
funding arrangements. 
Empirical reference is made to the Jamaican Development 
Bank, a governmental credit institution established in 1969, 
largely at the initiative c£ the World Bank, for the purpose of 
extendirg development loans. Since development banks in many 
countries have similar origins, funding patterns, and operational 
features, we suspect that more than a few of the conclusions 
derived here have wider_ applicability. However, comparative 
analyses are required before general conclusions can be drawn. 3 
Conventional Sources of Funds 
Public sector rural development banks conventionally have two 
major sources of funds, namely foreign funds and domestic 
budgetary contributions. Foreign funds are occasionally grants, 
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TABLE 1 
Major Sources of Funds for the Jamaica 
Development Bank 1970-1977 
Sources 
J$ Million 
Foreign 43.4 
Jamaica Government 96.5 
Jamaica Government 
Agencies 6.6 
Local Commercial 
Banks 11.1 
Repayments 6.6 
Miscellaneous * 19.9 
TOTAL 184.1 
% 
23.6 
52.4 
3.6 
6.0 
3.6 
10.8 
100.0 
Source: Compiled from sources and uses tables and balance 
sheet statements in annual reports of the Jamaica 
Development Bank. 
4 
Decrease in bank balances and cash balances comprised 
19 percent in 1972 and 26 percent in 1973. Decrease in 
investment in subsidiaries comprised 16 percent in 1974. 
These sources account for the large percentage share of 
"miscellaneous" over the period. 
3 
but more usually loans by foreign governments and by multilateral ~ 
agencies. The governments of the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and West Germany have made important contributions 
to the financing of agricultural development through the medium 
of rural development banks in low income countries. Multilateral 
development agencies, particularly the World Bank, and regional 
development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank 
have made sizeable loans to public and private development finance 
institutions serving rural communities in developing countries. 
Table 1 describes the composition of the total annual inflows 
of financial resources into the Jamaica Development Bank from 
1970 to 1977. Foreign sources accounted for 24 percent of these 
flows. Three external agencies accounted for the bulk of these 
foreign funds. The Inter-American Development Bank was the 
major single foreign source providing some 40 percent of foreign 
financial resources, followed by the World Bank with 25 percent, 
and the Caribbean Development Bank with 20 percent. 4 Jamaica 
Government loans and capital subscriptions accounted for 
52 percent of total inflows. From 1974 onwards, most of these 
financial transfers were in the form of equity. Loans from 
local banks accounted for only six percent of total resource 
inflows. 5 Repayments of loans by Jamaica Development Bank 
borrowers accounted for as little as four percent. It is 
evident, therefore, that for the period as a whole, external 
agencies and the Jamaican Government were the main sources from 
which the Jamaica Development Bank received its funds and that 
.. 
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~ employment. The rural credit agencies and their governments, 
generally incorporate these recommendations in their loan programs. 
This may be due to the fact that they share the developmental 
philosophy of donors or know they can circumvent the restrictions, 
and for other reasons such as their own limited knowledge and 
experience in agricultural development and financial planning, 
c 
their anxiety to obtain funding, and their perception of little 
negotiating space. The identification of target groups emphasizing 
the adoption of modern technology frequently results in loan 
portfolios biased towards labor-displacing imported capital goods, 
and towards larger farmers. 6 These biases negate the employment 
and equity objectives articulated by both local governments and 
donors. 
Following President McNamarat:s address to the Annual Meeting 
of the World Bank in Nairobi in 1973, official funding sources have 
sought to directly tackle the equity problem by devising'small 
farm credit programs and preferential schemes. Potential political 
gains from small farm programs give governments another reason for 
promoting these types of programs. In practice, concessionary 
interest rate policies combined with the high unit costs of small 
farmer loan programs cause development banks to favor large farmers. 
Sociopolitical realities of rural communities and bureaucratic 
inertia frequently reinforce this tendency (Lipton, Blair). 
However, the main point we wish to make is that the banks may be 
influenced by their funding agencies into servicing particular 
target groups which may not match their own loan management 
capabilities. 
repayment inf lows have been insignificant. The percentage 
contributions of the individual sources of financing varied 
over time. For all years, however, Jamaican Government 
contributions and foreign receipts were the largest elements. 
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Similarly detailed information is not available for the 
agricultural sector portfolio specifically. However, the data 
obtained from the Bank's Annual Reports reveal that foreign 
funds canprised between 35 percent and 67 percent of the total 
agricultural loan portfolio. The World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank have 
supported the agricultural loan portfolio. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LENDER BEHAVIOUR 
The sources and terms of obtaining financial resources can 
have a strong influence on credit policies and operational 
efficiency of banks. Donors and governments often try to 
influence the behaviour of credit institutions in ways that can 
affect their viability. Funds obtained from private financial 
institutions also have behavioral implications for rural banks. 
One important restriction is the specification of target 
groups and enterprises to be serviced by the banks. External 
funding agencies, while not generally stipulating the size and 
wealth characteristics of eligible farms, usually recommend types 
of enterprises that should receive favourable treatment. This 
kind of recommendation stems from their views about the catalytic 
roles of particular types of agricultural activity and about the 
suitability of these activities as instruments for technological ~ 
progress, improved nutritional levels, and expanded rural 
• 
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c Another type of restriction concerns short period production 
loans. It has not been unusual for external donors to prohibit 
the financing of working capital requirements out of project 
funds. For instance, the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the World Bank contracts with the Jamaica Development Bank 
contain such provisions. Underlying this kind of stipulation 
may be the belief that investment capital requirements should 
be accorded priority, that the private financial system can or 
should satisfy demands for working capital loans, or that the 
credit agency should fund its working capital loans from other 
sources. There are signs that the position of external creditors 
on working capital loans has become less rigid, as the following 
c-;, excerpt makes clear: 
c 
"In the initial stages of the transition to a more 
productive agriculture, access to short-term credit 
for purchasing fertilizer, improved seeds, pesticides, 
etc., is often of greater importance for small farmers 
than long-term credit. Accordingly, in the credit 
programs for small farmers, emphasis will be placed 
on short-term seasonal credit in the context of overall 
on-farm development planning. World Bank lending 
could provide a permanent working capital fund for this 
purpose which is rolled over and reused from year to 
year. As the Bank loan or IDA credit is repaid, domestic 
sources of credit and capital can gradually replace 
external funds." 
(World Bank, p. 19). 
Following upon Adam's work (1971), the influence of 
governmental agencies and of external donors on interest rate 
policies has been more widely recognized. Recent events in 
Jamaica give support to findings in other countries. The 
Jamaican government, and foreign agencies provide funds at 
concessionary rates of interest and require the Jamaica Develop-
ment Bank to onlend at concessional nominal loan rates which in 
real terms are either substantially negative, or close to zero 
when positive. Concessionary interest rate policies result in 
high loan administration costs and a bias towards large farmers. 
This worsens income distribution and undermines institutional 
viability. There is no doubt that external donors are aware 
of the limitations of concessionary rates of interest for the 
financial sector, the rural economy, and for general economic 
development. The World Bank (1975, pp. 12-13} has discussed 
factors such as resource misallocation, wealth gains by larger 
farmers, losses incurred by lenders, and political corruption 
and abuse. At the same time, local governments perceive certain 
advantages in concessionary loan rates, using them to partially 
correct for the adverse terms of trade between agriculture and 
the rest of the economy, as hidden subsidies, and as convenient 
means of political patronage and manipulation. Consequently, 
while piecemeal and gradual interest rate reform is occurring in 
a few countries, progress towards interest rate politices that 
reflect the scarcity value of capital and the costs of funds is 
likely to be slow. 
Restrictions on lender behaviour are also associated with 
the foreign currency debts incurred by rural banks in their 
acquisition of foreign funds for onlending locally. The banks 
8 
are usually required to repay their foreign debts in the currencies 
in which the debts are denominated. Since devaluation of the 
~· 
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local currency will automatically increase the local currency 
value of debts denominated in foreign currency, foreign exchange 
risks are associated with the foreign currency debts of rural 
banks. Local governments sometimes assume these foreign 
exchange risks. However, it is not unconunon for external 
donors to stipulate that the sub-borrowers (i.e., rural bank 
customers) bear the foreign exchange costs associated with 
their loans, i.e., incur the additional local currency costs 
growing out of any future devaluations. 
A few other short run aspects of the type of funding 
arrangements described in the previous section also merit 
discussion. To the extent that loans from local governments, 
their agencies, and local conunercial banks tend to be of short 
maturities, rural development banks may be predisposed to lend 
for quick gestation projects. The fact that this tendency 
counter-balances the bias towards long term loans created by 
external funds emphasizes the importance of harmonizing the 
sources and uses of funds and the desired loan operations of 
rural banks. 
Further, unless there is a large rollover or debt 
rescheduling, the short maturities of their debt places 
considerable demands on annual inf lows of new funds. Debt 
service and amortization consume large proportions of new 
resources thereby reducing that which is available for new 
lending to farmers. Between 1971 and 1977, total debt service and 
amortization payments by the Jamaica Development Bank averaged 
20 percent of its annual available resources. 
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The final aspect of external funding pertains to the negative ~ 
influence of a too rapid disbursement of funds on the quality 
of the loan portfolio. Both local governments and foreign 
agencies inject large amounts of financial resources into rural 
banks in the early stages of their operations, usually before 
well-functioning loan appraisal and monitoring systems are 
organized and staffed. Rapid growth of loan approvals and 
disbursements seriously burden these weak loan management systems 
and result in poor loan quality and high arrears ratios. These 
problems are compounded when funding agencies measure the 
perfo.nnance of rural banks by the growth of their loan disbursements. 
Frequently, this is the only performance measure used in the 
early years when few loans fall due and incipient arrears 
problems go undetected. In these circumstances, the banks 
themselves may yield to the pressure to approve and disburse as 
many loans as possible, sacrificing efficiency and loan quality 
in the process. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LOAN PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE 
We have argued that funding agencies influence the credit 
operations of rural banks. By so doing, they contribute to 
the loan repayment problems experienced by these banks. Our 
demonstration of this proposition will center on the possible 
implications of lender preferences for particular enterprises 
and inputs, the nonprovision of working capital loans, and the 
policy on foreign exchange costs. 
' 
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Debt financed expansion of fann enterprises increases the 
borrower's financial risks. Any variation of expected returns 
tends to increase with consequent greater potential loss of 
equity capital. Hopkins, Barry and Baker (Chap. 7) demonstrate 
this principle of increasing risk with the ·aid of the following 
simple model. Let the model for the growth in equity be: 
(1) G = (L (r-i) + r) (1-c) (1 - t) 
when G = percent growth in equity; L = leverage ratio., i.e., 
the ratio of debt to equity; r = rate of return; i = interest 
rate on debt; c = farmer's average propensity to absorb gross 
farm income; and t = rate of income taxation. Then assuming 
constant numerical values for i, e, and t, one can trace the 
effects on G of increasing Lfor equal absolute variations of r 
around zero. Negative proportionate changes in equity (i.e., 
equity loss} increasingly outweigh positive changes (i.e., 
equity gains} as leverage increases. 
Some farm liquidity is reduced by the act of borrowing 
itself. Some degree of self-financing is generally associated 
with debt-financed capital formation. Counterpart requirements 
imposed by lenders usually ensure that some of the farmer's 
own resources complement loan funds. In this way, some or all 
of the farmer's actual liquidity might be absorbed. Also, 
depending on the degree to which farm enterprises utilize their 
existing assets as loan collateral, there is a corresponding 
reduction of unutilized borrowing capacity or potential liquidity 
12 
(Hopkins, Barry, Baker, 1973, Chap. 8). The seriousness of the 
loss of potential liquidity is of course moderated by the degree 
to which farm enterprises can obtain unsecured credit. They 
often manage to do so but only in small amounts and at high 
cost from the informal rural credit markets. Paradoxically, 
liquidity is often scarcest during the period of greater 
financial risk when more liquidity is needed. 
Farmers traditionally attempt to reduce financial risk by 
diversifying their output in order to stabilize gross income 
flows. The scope for stabilizing net income flows is greater to 
the degree that input use is sufficiently flexible to permit 
downward adjustment when warranted by product demand conditions 
and relative factor prices. Lender restrictions and preferences 
reduce the scope for these forms of risk minimization. 
Lender preferences for particular types of enterprises will 
usually alter the optimal product mix of farm debtors (Hopkins, 
Barry, Baker, Ch. 8). Assuming for simplicity, perfect 
competition in product and factor markets, the optimal output 
mix in the absence of credit is given by the condition: 
(2) 
where Y1 and y2 are products, and pl and P2 are expected product 
prices. The optimality condition in debt situations is: 
-dY pl cl (3) 2 + dYl = p2 c2 
• 
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where c1 and c2 are terms reflecting differences in the availability 
and cost of 
cl 
where - -
c2 -
credit for the two products. Only in those rare cases 
pl 
p2 
will the optimal product mix be unaltered by the 
enterprise preferences of lenders. 
Similarly, the optimal combination of inputs may be altered 
by lender preferences, the without-credit optimality condition 
being: 
(4) 
-dX 1 
= 
and the with-credit optimality condition being: 
(5) 
-dX 1 
dX2 = 
+ 
where x1 and x2 are inputs with factor prices F 1 and F2 respectively, 
and i 1 and i 2 are the marginal costs of financing those inputs. 
The possible outcome of stipulations concerning specific 
product types and pure stand cultivation is a lower level of 
product diversification, particularly with respect to those short 
term cash crops which would not only create a greater degree 
of flexibility in product choice, but would also help to boost 
farm incomes in the early stages of the longer gestation projects 
which rural banks prefer. The technological bias implies that 
f arrners adopting the lender-preferred technique of production 
might be locked into a situation where reductions in the utilization 
of capital goods cannot be efficiently made, and in which there 
is limited scope for substituting a cheaper factor, e.g., family 
14 
labor, for more expensive capital services. Consequently there 
may be an increase in their vulnerability to falling product 
prices and to rising costs of capital services (especially 
important under conditions of exchange rate depreciation). Any 
pressure on net farm income might well put pressure on debt- • 
servicing capacity and result in loan delinquency. 
c 
A farm enterprise can attempt to moderate temporary debt 
service difficulties by reducing its average propensity to 
consume, or morelikely by attempting to obtain short-term credit. 
However, as we have argued earlier, rural development banks are 
not usually a source of short-term credit. Nor are such 
resources readily forthcoming from commercial banks that are 
the predominant mobilizers of local financial savings and the ~ 
principal short-term lenders. Commercial banks in lesser 
developed countries employ quite restrictive credit criteria 
and portfolio preferences. These exclude most potential 
agricultural borrowers. Selective loan guarantee and rediscount 
schemes have not been successful in encouraging a greater 
volume of commercial bank credit to agriculture, since attempts 
to collect on defaulted or delinquent loans that are guaranteed 
involve expensive and time consuming legal procedures. A case 
can be made, therefore, for rural development banks to directly 
provide production loans. Where external funding agencies 
-
preclude the use of their project funds for working capital 
loans, the rural banks can nonetheless attempt to fill this 
~-
a 
c 
credit gap by mobilizing local resources either by borrowing 
from the private financial sector or by directly providing a 
deposit service. 
15 
We turn now to the implications of the policy on foreign 
exchange costs. This centers around the question of who should 
bear the risk and the additional unpredictable rise in loan 
costs associated with fixed foreign currency obligations when 
there is a devaluation of the local currency. Essentially, 
these costs if borne by the farmer can be incorporated into 
the interest rate variable in equation (1). An increase in 
foreign exchange costs reduces farm capital growth by 
reducing the net rate of return. The foreign exchange costs 
implied by the stipulations on exchange risk are uncertain in 
nature but do assume serious proportions in countries experiencing 
large and repetitive exchange rate devaluations. These costs 
are not easily absorbed by farmers under conditions of weak 
product markets. 
Donor agencies have argued that with devaluation-induced 
increases in domestic farm product prices and with improved 
international price competitiveness, domestic sub-borrowers 
should be net gainers from repetitive devaluations and should 
therefore experience no great difficulty in repaying loans 
with the added devaluation costs. However devaluation-induced 
increases in factor costs and the continuing price control 
policies for farm products erode these potential gains. As a 
result, the conditions assumed to be operative by donors are 
• 
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not readily satisfied at least in the short run. Severe debt 
repayment problems are more likely to result because of the 
abruptness of the exchange rate adjustment which raises debt 
costs immediately whereas the income effects of attempts to 
phase out price controls takes much longer. Some reconsideration 
of this policy seems warranted. It seems reasonable to assume 
that the rural banks, by virtl..E of the larger scale of their 
operations and by the adoption of loan pricing policies which 
include a small premium for exchange risk, can better hedge 
against foreign exc_hange risks associated with foreign currency 
debt. 
Another consequence of the foreign exchange stipulation 
under conditions of currency depreciation is an increase in the 
rural bank's risk exposure. The upward readjustment of the 
current local currency value of a loan is unaccompanied by a 
similar revision of pledged collateral. This implies that the 
existing collateral covers a smaller proportion of current loan 
value than the bank regards as prudent. In effect, the bank's 
risk exposure increases. 
LONG RUN VIABILITY AND GROWTH 
Rural development banks in order to perform a meaningful 
- credit role through time must expand the nominal volume of their 
loans on a continuous basis. The underlying requirement is for 
sources of funds whose time profiles are consistent with continuous 
growth in lending capacity. This feature of financial institution 
behaviour, so much in the forefront of management decisions of Cl 
• 
: 
' 
c 
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private financial institutions such as commercial banks, has been 
neglected in the study of rural development banks. The omission 
is potentially serious. An examination of the time profile of 
inf lows of loanable funds from external agencies and local 
governments often reveals that they do not constitute an 
adequate basis for sustained institutional growth. 
External funding tends to be large in the early life of the 
rural development bank, but declines after a period of years. 
The cessation of external funding may reflect one or more factors. 
Funding agencies as a matter of policy may wish to prevent continued 
reliance on their resources. Furthermore, the arrears problem, 
typically disguised in the earlier years by extensive grace periods, 
becomes clearer as more loans fall due. This may result in the 
suspension of disbursements on existing loan contracts and a refusal 
to replenish resources by new contracts unless institutional reforms 
occur. The prospects for reform, of course, are conditional upon 
debt recovery and, at the same time, by the overall economic 
environment affecting the prospects for economic recovery, the 
restructuring of interest rates and the political environment 
influencing the prospects for foreclosures on collateral. Another 
possibility is that drastic shifts in the economic policy position 
of governments of developing countries may induce a slowing down 
of disbursements and other financial sanctions by the donor agencies. 
In practice it is the first two which seem to be responsible for the 
decline in foreign resource flows to rural development banks in 
less developed countries. 
Capital subscriptions by the government cannot be relied upon 
for continued growth. A study of the Jamaica Development Bank's 
funding pattern shows that periodic capital subscriptions, while 
18 
increasing the flow of governmental resources over time, have not 
been the main vehicle for channelling governmental resources to the 
institution. Rather, there has been an increase in the importance 
of governmental loans. This funding pattern can create a problem 
since continued reliance on loans from the budget is constrained 
by the usual competition for budgetary resources within the 
government. Furthermore, economic and political limitations 
on the growth of the government budget constrain the degree to 
which governmental contributions can maintain their momentum and 
continue to offset the decline in external resource inflows. 
Repayment inf lows ideally should provide an increasing 
stream of resources in the evolution of development banks. In 
practice, however, the later stages of banking operations may 
• 
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be characterized by rapidly expanding arrears and increasing ~ 
provisions for bad debt rather than by smoothly upward rising 
payment inflows. Consequently, repayment inflows net of the 
bank's repayment outflows to foreign donors may be negative, 
since an increasing proportion of the long-term external debt 
falls due some ten to fifteen years from the original loan 
dates. 
Given the time profiles of funding described above, rural 
development banks are likely to become increasingly prone to 
resource crises. In many cases, these crises are averted by 
new injections of foreign funds. In the Jamaican case, the 
crises have culminated in institutional credit cycles in that 
c 
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crisis-ridden institutions go out of existence or become moribund, 
and are replaced by institutions which constitute a new basis 
for government and foreign funding, providing the same range 
of services as the defunct institutions. Thus, the Agricultural 
Credit Board in 1960 replaced the Agricultural Loan Society 
Board,wh.ichin turn was replaced by the Jamaica Development Bank 
commercial window program and the Self-Supporting Farmers 
Development Program in 1970. 
POSSIBLE MEANS OF RESOLVING FUNDING PROBLEMS 
We have contended that rural development banks' patterns of 
funding may seriously constrain their allocative and operational 
efficiency, and their long run growth. One solution to this 
problem is to attempt to alter the operational criteria and loan 
preferences of the funding agencies themselves. Another solution 
is to develop new sources of funding that are not subject to 
the same limitations. The latter solution is analyzed in this 
section. Three methods of developing new sources of funds are 
examined, namely deposits, bond issues, and earmarked taxes. 
Public sector development banks do not usually accept 
deposits from the public. Nonetheless, there are potentially 
important gains to be derived from providing deposit facilities. 
The provision of these facilities removes a peculiar constricting 
feature of this type of financial institution, namely, that 
their credit operations and debt repayments do not themselves 
provide a steady return flow of funds to the banks as deposits. 
This is quite unlike the case of deposit-taking institutions, 
20 
e.g., conunercial banks, where expended credit balances and deposit ~ 
withdrawals return partially at least to the financial institutions 
in the form of new deposits thereby ensuring no full and permanent 
leakage of loanable resources from the financial insi~itutions. 
For rural development banks, which do not have deposit facilities, 
the leakage is both full and permanent. Furthermore, deposits 
constitute a more general and diversified source of loanable funds. 
There is accordingly a greater degree of freedom from portfolio 
restructions and control by funding entities. Additionally, the 
fact that the continued ability of a bank to attract deposits 
depends on potential depositors' confidence in the banks' 
financial management forces greater adherence to financial 
• 
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discipline. This can result in more efficient loan appraisal ~ 
and more effective loan collections. Finally, where loan customers 
are also depositors, rural development banks have a potentially 
greater informational basis for monitoring the financial 
performance of their debtors. 
In retrospect, it would appear more promising to incorporate 
a d~velopment bank portfolio within a well established 
conunercial banking institution rather than the other way 
around. This would ensure financial discipline and effective 
monitoring of the portfolio from the very beginning. This 
latter point illustrates one of the most promising opportunities 
lost by donors and LDC's in the 1970s, namely, the incorporation 
of a small but viable and slowly growing long run development 
portfolio within a nationalized commercial banking 
network. Instead, donors and LDCs moved headlong into 
• 
• 
• 
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promoting separate limited service development banks which were 
ill prepared to design, evaluate, disburse and monitor their loan 
portfolio with the insight, discipline and caution that a well 
trained and experienced commercial banking staff could have 
brought to the task . 
Local and foreign bond issues are another mechanism for 
raising resources. Some external funding agencies such as the 
World Bank certainly see this option as a preferred one for 
national and regional development banks attempting to reduce 
their reliance on multilateral concessional funding. Both 
means of financing impose some degree of market discipline on 
rural banks. The difficulties of international bond issues are 
well known. They include: (1) legal and other institutional 
barriers to entry into developed countries' capital markets; 
(2) the inability of lesser developed countries to satisfy the 
informational requirements for bond placements; (3) quantitative 
limits on foreign country issues in the domestic capital markets 
of the developed countries; and (4) discriminatory taxation of 
interest income derived for foreign bondholdings. Efforts at 
improving developing countries' access to capital markets in 
developed countries are currently being made at the international 
level (Development Committee, 1978). At the present time, 
however, one cannot hold out much hope for substantial foreign 
bond financing of national development banks. 
Domestic bond issues are also subject to difficulties. Low 
levels of private. wealth, rudimentary capital markets, and 
22 
financial risk aversion among households and corporations are 
characteristic of underdeveloped financial structures. Each 
constitutes a major barrier to successful bond issues. Private 
financial institutions which command most domestic financial 
savings tend to confine their equity investment to short-term 
and long-term government securities. Therefore, greater access 
• 
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to their resources can only arise through competition with 
central government financing or from policy measures that 
explicitly favor acquisition of development bank bonds. The 
Jamaican experience reveals that short-term budgetary require-
ments of the government may prevail over the financing requirements 
of public sector development banks. However, this need not be 
the case, and development banks may prove capable of bidding 
away financial resources from the recurrent budget. 
Proposals are sometimes made to compel private financial 
institutions to acquire development bonds. Among the devices 
proposed are earmarking part of the proceeds of central bank legal 
requirements, and the imposition of legal requirements that 
private financial institutions invest directly a portion of their 
assets in development bank bonds. While providing for automatic 
growth of resources, these devices reduce financial discipline in 
rural credit institutions, and may reduce the overall efficiency 
of financial resource use. 
An issue of optimal timing arises with respect to both deposit 
mobilization and bond issues by rural development banks. The 
ability of the banks to attract funds through either mechanism 
c 23 depends on the state of their financial portfolios. The tendency 
of rural development banks to experience serious arrears and 
liquidity problems implies that public issues of bonds or 
deposit acceptance are not likely to be particularly successful 
if they are attempted after the institutions' public image is 
one of financial mismanagement and near bankruptcy. In effect, 
a case can be made for the early adoption of these two financial 
mechanisms given the difficulty of doing so later, and the role 
they can play in instilling financial discipline at a crucial 
early stage of the institutional life cycle. As mentioned 
earlier,the issue of optimal timing for creating a stronger 
liability base can also be tied in with the issue of the optimal 
~ institutional method of incorporating a development portfolio 
in the young and imperfectly developed capital markets of LDCs. 
Building this portfolio within the institutional setting of a 
nationalized commercial bank may prove to be a more viable and 
self-sustaining institutional vehicle for promoting the growth 
of development financing in many LDCs. 
At the level of governmental budgetary support, taxes can 
be earmarked for contribution to the rural development bank. 
This would essentially result in linking the growth of budgetary 
resources to the growth of fiscal revenues. However, like other 
forms of government budgetary support, it may result in political 
interference with credit allocation and loan collection operations, 
and in financial laxity. 
c 
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CONCLUSIONS ~· 
Some important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing 
analysis. First, public sector rural development banks are 
heavily dependent on local governments and external agencies for 
their funding. Local private sector financial institutions and 
loan recoveries within the rural banks themselves are not • "' 
significant sources of loanable funds. Second, the influence 
exerted by the two main sources of funding on the lending 
practices of rural banks may contribute to the weakening of 
loan portfolio performance and overall financial viability of 
these banks. Third, none of the resultant portfolio decisions 
are necessarily consistent with allocative efficiency, 
distributional equity, or higher levels of rural employment. 
Fourth, the tendency of the major resource inflows to diminish 
drastically after the first decade of a rural development bank's 
life-cycle threatens the long run viability and growth of 
these banks. 
These short and long period implications lead to the 
overriding conclusion that the sources of funding should be 
broadened to include less restrictive and more dynamic resource 
inflows. Three extensions, namely, deposit mobilization, bond 
issues, and earmarked taxes were examined briefly. Deposit 
mobilization and local bond issues are preferable and are also 
potentially more successful methods of funding, provided they 
are initiated at a relatively early stage in a rural development 
bank's life-cycle. 
25 
However, once the banks have evolved into the classic resource 
crises discussed in this paper, the policy space for effective 
restructuring of resource inflows will have been severely 
reduced. In this case, no formula for reform and survival is 
easy to devise. Liability structures appropriately designed 
from the outset may prevent or moderate many of the short and 
• long run problems typically experienced by rural development 
banks. 
c 
1. 
2. 
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FOOTNOTES 
This paper is a revised version of one presented at the 
Second International Conference on Rural Finance Research 
Issues in Calgary, Canada, August 29-September 1, 1979. 
We are grateful for the comments and advice of Dale W. 
Adams, Caludio Gonzalez-Vega, and J.D. Van Pischke. 
For convenience of expression, we maintain the convention 
of referring to these institutions as "banks" despite the 
fact that they rarely accept deposits from the public. 
3. Claudio Gonzalez-Vega has informed us that his study 
of 50 development banks in Latin America confirms our 
thesis. 
4. Jamaica is a member of the World Bank, the IDB, and the 
CDB. However, loans from these institutions are treated 
as external since Jamaica does not exercise a decisive 
influence on their credit operations. 
s. Loans from overseas banks are treated as foreign loans. 
Loans from resident-expatriate banks are treated as local. 
6. The bias towards large farms results from the fact that the 
range of imported capital goods tends. to be suitable only 
for larger scale operations. 
' 
• 
. . 
c 
c 
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